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In many real life decisions, options are distributed in space and time,
making it necessary to search sequentially through them, often with-
out a chance to return to a rejected option. The optimal strategy in
these tasks is to choose the first option that is above a threshold
that depends on the current position in the sequence. The implicit
decision making strategies by humans vary but largely diverge from
this optimal strategy. The reasons for this divergence remain un-
known. We present a new model of human stopping decisions in
sequential decision making tasks based on a linear threshold heuris-
tic. The first two studies demonstrate that the linear threshold model
accounts better for sequential decision making than existing models.
Moreover, we show that the model accurately predicts participants’
search behavior in different environments. In the third study, we con-
firm that the model generalizes to a real-world problem, thus pro-
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Decisions that arise in everyday life often have to be made1
when options are presented sequentially. For example, search-2
ing for a parking spot, deciding when to take a vacation day, or3
finding a partner, all require that the decision maker accepts4
or rejects an option without knowing if future options will be5
more attractive. Decisions in such problems involve a trade-off6
between accepting a possibly suboptimal option prematurely7
and rejecting the current offer out of false hopes for better8
options in the future.9
Despite the importance of such decisions, relatively little10
work has been made toward characterizing the process by11
which humans decide to stop searching in natural settings of12
this task.13
Earlier research has focused on a simplified version of opti-14
mal stopping problems, the so-called secretary problem, where15
only the rank of the option relative to those already seen is16
shown (1–3) and only the overall best alternative is rewarded.17
In the secretary problem, the optimal strategy is to ascertain18
the maximum of the first 37% options and choose the next op-19
tion that exceeds this threshold (4). Empirical studies suggest20
that in general people follow a similar strategy but usually21
set the cut-off (i.e., from which point on they will accept an22
option that exceeds the previous options) earlier than the 37%23
prescribed by the optimal solution (1, 5).24
Some studies have investigated tasks closer to real sequen-25
tial choice problems by presenting the actual value of the26
option to the decision makers (6–10). In this version, the27
optimal is based on calculating the probability of winning on28
the later positions. From this probability, a threshold is calcu-29
lated for each option in the sequence as described by Gilbert30
and Mosteller (4, Section 3). Lee (6) estimated a family of31
threshold-based models and showed that most participants 32
decreased their choice thresholds as sequences progress. Al- 33
though people are overall quite heterogeneous in their search 34
behavior, they tend to cluster around the optimal solution 35
(7, 8). Importantly, these studies still kept the restriction that 36
only the best alternative is rewarded—a payoff function that 37
does not correspond well with everyday experiences. Humans 38
do find a mate, an apartment to live, or a ticket to fly to their 39
vacation destination, and thus receive some payoff, even if that 40
may not be the highest possible payoff. 41
In the present research, we propose a model of human 42
decision making in optimal stopping problems using payoffs 43
that are based on the actual values. In this variant of the 44
search problem, the optimal decision thresholds are calculated 45
based on the expected reward of the remaining options ((4, 46
Section 5b) and SI Appendix, Text A). This leads to a decision 47
threshold that changes notably nonlinear over the sequence. 48
In contrast, we propose that people rely on a mental short- 49
cut and adapt their thresholds linearly over the sequence. We 50
show that a model with this linearity assumption accurately 51
captures when people stop search and accept an option, even 52
in a real-world setting. Furthermore, this model allows us 53
to predict under which conditions people search more or less 54
than the optimal model, making it a useful tool to understand 55
human sequential decision making. 56
We first sketch a family of cognitive models for describing 57
behavior in optimal stopping problems. We then present re- 58
sults from three behavioral experiments that provide evidence 59
for the validity of the linear model in a laboratory setting as 60
well as in a real-world scenario. 61
Significance Statement
Behavioral research has made rapid progress toward revealing
the processes by which we make choices between options that
are presented simultaneously. Decisions in everyday life are
typically more complex. We often encounter choices where
options are separated in space and time and therefore the
question is: “When is the right time to stop searching?” We
suggest that humans use a probabilistic threshold. A model
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optimal policy prescribes a non-linear change, provides an
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Computational models. We explain the computational models62
based on a typical optimal stopping problem that we also63
used in our first two experiments. The decision maker (here a64
customer) is planing a vacation and decides to buy the plane65
ticket online. Ticket prices vary randomly from day to day and66
the customer wants to find the cheapest ticket. The customer67
checks the ticket price every day and decides if she wants to68
accept or reject the ticket, without having the option to go69
back in time to a previously rejected offer. Search time is70
limited by her vacation schedule (i.e., 10 decisions per trial)71
and, once accepted, the search ends.72
More formally, we consider a decision maker who encounters73
a sequence of tickets with values denoted by x1, . . . , x10 and74
she wants to find the minimum value in the sequence. If the75
decision maker accepts ticket xi, the sequence terminates and76
she has to pay xi; otherwise, she continues to the next ticket.77
When the last ticket is reached, it must be accepted.78
All models assume that the decision maker relies on a prob-
abilistic threshold to make the decision to accept or reject a
ticket—i.e., ticket xi on position i is compared to a position
dependent threshold ti. This comparison yields an accep-
tance probability θi based on a sigmoid choice function with
sensitivity parameter β and
θi =
1
1 + exp{β(xi − ti)}
. [1]
Small values of β produce more stochasticity in decisions,79
whereas the policy approaches determinism when β →∞.80
We examine the setting of thresholds by comparing the81
performance of four different models.82
• The Independent Threshold Model (ITM) serves as our83
baseline. It assumes no dependency between the thresh-84
olds. It entails N independent threshold parameters85
t1, ..., tN , one for each position in the sequence, where86
the decision maker can decide to accept or reject an of-87
fer (at position N + 1 the ticket must be accepted). The88
thresholds can take any value across positions. The model89
maintains maximal flexibility and provides an upper limit90
how well any threshold model can describe a person’s91
decision given the assumption of a probabilistic threshold.92
• The Linear Threshold Model (LTM) postulates that the
thresholds are constrained by a linear relation to each
other and therefore are completely defined by the first
threshold t0 and the linear increase δ as the sequence
progresses:
ti+1 = ti + δ · i, [2]
This model entails three free parameters, the first thresh-93
old t0, the increase of the threshold δ and the choice94
sensitivity β.95
• The The Biased Optimal Model (BOM) is based on the
Bias-from-Optimal threshold model proposed by Guan
et al. (8), assuming that humans are using thresholds
that deviate systematically from the optimal thresholds..
The optimal thresholds t∗i for each position i are derived
by determining the expected reward of the remaining
options (derivation in (4, Section 5b) and in SI Appendix,
Text A). The model entails a systematic bias parameter γ
that reflects the divergence of the human threshold from
the optimal one. Additionally, the thresholds depend
on a parameter α that determines how much their bias
increases or decreases as the sequence progresses.
ti = t∗i + γ + α · i, [3]
When γ and α are set to 0, the thresholds represent the 96
optimal thresholds that lead to best performance. This 97
model is therefore defined by three free parameters, γ, α 98
and the choice sensitivity β. 99
• The Cut-off Model (CoM) is inspired by the optimal deci- 100
sion rule for the rank information version of the secretary 101
problem where the distribution of the prices is unknown. 102
It assumes that the DM has a fixed cut-off value k that 103
determines how long she explores in the beginning of the 104
sequence. The highest value seen in that initial sample 105
of k tickets is then set as her threshold, and the first 106
value that exceeds this threshold in the remainder of the 107
sequence is chosen. This model has two free parameters, 108
the cut-off value k and the sensitivity parameter β. 109
Models were implemented in a hierarchical-Bayesian statis- 110
tical framework using JAGS (11) (SI Appendix, Text B). 111
Experiment 1. We asked 129 participants to solve a computer- 112
based optimal stopping problem following the ticket-shopping 113
task described above. Tickets were normally distributed with 114
a mean value of $180 and a standard deviation of $20. In the 115
first phase, subjects learned the distribution using a graphical 116
method proposed by (12) (Methods). SI Appendix, Fig. S1A 117
shows that this procedure was successful in ensuring partici- 118
pants learned the distribution. 119
In the second phase, participants performed 200 trials of 120
the ticket-shopping task. In each trial, participants searched 121
through a sequence of ten ticket prices. For each ticket, they 122
could decide to accept or reject it at their own pace. Partici- 123
pants were aware that they could see up to 10 tickets in each 124
trial, and they were always informed about the actual position 125
and the number of remaining tickets (SI Appendix, Fig. S2E 126
for a screen shot). It was not possible to go back to an earlier 127
option after it was initially declined. If they reached the last 128
ticket (10th) they were forced to choose this ticket. When 129
participants accepted the ticket, they received feedback about 130
how much they could have saved if they had chosen the best 131
ticket in the sequence. Performance was incentivized based on 132
the value of the chosen ticket (Methods). 133
Behavioral results. Subjects earned on average 17.1 points (SD: 134
4.2) in each trial (maximum points = 20), which represents 135
a 6% loss on optimal earnings. Participants’ marginal accept 136
probabilities steadily increased as the sequence progressed 137
(Fig. 1A, black line), but differed systematically from the opti- 138
mal agent’s accept probability (Fig. 1A, yellow line). On the 139
second-to-last (9th) position, participants accepted the ticket 140
only with a 28%, 95%-CI [26%, 29%], probability, whereas 141
following the optimal policy would result in a significantly 142
higher acceptance rate of 50%. 143
Overall, subjects stopped earlier than optimal. The average 144
position at which a ticket was accepted was 4.7 (SD: 2.9), 145
whereas an optimal agent would have stopped at an average 146
stopping position of 5.2 (SD: 2.8). However, a closer look at 147
Fig. 1A reveals that whether subjects accept too early or too 148
late depends on the position: on earlier positions they accept 149
options although they should continue to search, whereas, if 150
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Fig. 1. (A) Probability to accept a ticket on each position across all prices. The dark line represents participant’s frequency to accept, the dashed yellow line an optimal agent‘s
probability to accept. (B) Participants’ probability to accept. Each line represents ticket prices ranging from the first quantile to the fifth quantile. Q1: Tickets in first quantile, Q2:
Tickets ranging from the first to the second quantile etc. The size of circles correspond to the number of data points on each position. (C) Estimated thresholds for the ITM with
9 free threshold parameters (solid blue line), the LTM with 2 free threshold parameters (dashed red line) and the BOM with 2 free threshold parameters (dash-dotted yellow line)
(D) Posterior predictive mean and 95% HDI of the LTM (dashed red line) and the BOM (dash-dotted yellow line) for Q1 to Q5, as indicated in (B). Data: solid black lines
they get to position 7, they continue searching even for options151
that should be accepted according to the optimal policy.152
Fig. 1B shows the accept probabilities conditional on ticket153
prices, split into the first five quantile ranges Q1 - Q5 (out154
of a total of ten quantile ranges). Qi is defined as the range155
of ticket prices from the 0.ith to the (0.i− 0.1)th quantile of156
the ticket price distribution. In this experiment, the ticket157
distribution corresponds to a Gaussian distribution with mean158
180 and standard deviation of 20. Accept probabilities for159
Q4 and Q5 did not reach 50% at position 9, in contrast to160
the optimal strategy that predicts much higher acceptance161
probabilities at this position.162
Our models did not assume any learning over trials. This163
assumption was supported by an analysis of performance across164
trials. A linear mixed model on points per trial with trial165
number as fixed effect and by-participant random intercepts166
and random slopes for trial number showed no significant effect167
of trial number, F (1, 64.00) = 0.02, p = 0.88.168
Modeling results and discussion. First, we checked whether169
the key assumptions of the modeling framework were sup-170
ported. We calculated, per participant and model, posterior171
predictive p-values (ppp) that compared misfit (i.e., deviance)172
of the observed data with misfit of synthetic generated data173
from the model. For the baseline model, ITM, this analysis174
indicated that the absolute fit was very good, and a proba-175
bilistic threshold adequately describes participants’ responses;176
ppp < .05 for only 8% of participants (SI Appendix, Fig. S3A).177
For the vast majority of participants the observed misfit was178
consistent with the assumptions of the ITM plus sampling 179
variability. 180
The performance of the LTM was almost identical to the 181
ITM, suggesting that the considerably more parsimonious 182
LTM (three free parameters for LTM compared to ten for 183
ITM) adequately describes behaviour in optimal stopping 184
tasks. The distribution of ppp-values of the LTM was almost 185
identical to the ITM (SI Appendix, Fig. S3A-B). Fig. 1D 186
provides qualitative evidence of the agreement between LTM 187
and data; the LTM adequately predicts accept probabilities 188
for each quantile at every position (see SI Appendix, Fig. S4 189
for agreement between ITM and data). Fig. 1C compares the 190
recovered thresholds of ITM and LTM and shows that the 191
ITM thresholds essentially form a straight line lying exactly 192
on top of the LTM thresholds. 193
The absolute fit of the BOM is clearly worse than for 194
ITM/LTM; ppp < .05 for 35% of participants (SI Appendix, 195
Fig. S3C). The source for this increased misfit can be seen 196
in Fig. 1D. Only for Q1 and early positions of Q4 and Q5 197
did the BOM provide an adequate account. Furthermore, the 198
recovered thresholds (Fig. 1C) of the BOM clearly differ from 199
the ITM in almost all positions. Results of the CoM are not 200
shown explicitly as its performance was extremely poor. All 201
ppp = 0; there was not a single posterior sample for which the 202
observed misfit of the CoM was smaller than for synthetic data 203
generated from the CoM. Furthermore, choices were essentially 204
random for CoM with βCoM = 0.02 [0.01, 0.06] (for the other 205
models, β ≈ 0.21). 206
Participants differed in their first threshold and slope pa- 207





































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2. Results of experiment 2: Empirical data appear in black lines and the posterior predictive means of the LTM in red lines. Bars represent the 95% HDI. The different lines
represent the tickets ranging in from the Q1 to Q5. Q1: Tickets in first quantile, Q2: Tickets between the first and second quantile etc. (A) Condition 1: Tickets are left skewed
distributed (PERT(40,195,200)) corresponding to a scare environment. (B) Condition 2: Tickets are normally distributed (PERT(90,140,190)). (C) Condition 3: Tickets are right
skewed distributed (PERT(120,125,400)) corresponding to a plentiful environment.
rameters estimated by the LTM. However, all slope parameters208
are larger than 0 indicating that all participants increased the209
thresholds over the sequence (see also SI Appendix, Text C).210
These results suggest that humans use a linear threshold211
when searching for the best option. In the present tests we212
found that the human performance is only 6% off from the213
performance of an optimal agent, indicating that the linear214
strategy performs quite well. Therefore, using linear thresholds215
could be an ecologically sensible adaptation to sequential216
choice tasks. However, it could also mean that the LTMs good217
performance might not generalize to new task environments,218
in which the linear model performs less well – an ability that219
would be crucial for the LTM to be a useful model of human220
behavior.221
Search behavior in Experiment 1 indicated that people de-222
viate from the optimal model depending on the price structure223
of the sequence: In trials with good options in the beginning224
people tended to accept them too early. However, in trials with225
few or no good options they continued search longer than the226
optimal model prescribed (SI Appendix, Fig. S5). Accordingly,227
in tasks with plenty of good options people might search less228
than optimal. However, in tasks in which good options are229
rare they might be tempted to search too long.230
To find out and further predict how people will adapt to231
the tasks, we conducted a simulation study comparing the232
optimal solution with a best performing linear model (using233
a grid search to find the best performing parameter values234
for the linear model) and an empirical study manipulating235
the distributions of ticket prices across three conditions: (1)236
a left skewed distribution simulating a scarce environment,237
(2) a normal distribution, (3) a right skewed distribution238
simulating an environment with plentiful desirable alternatives.239
As illustrated in SI Appendix, Fig. S6B, the simulation study240
showed that the optimal model predicts more search in a241
plentiful environment, whereas a linear model predicts more242
search in the scarce environment. Furthermore, the linear243
model predicts a stronger decline in performance in the scarce244
environment than the optimal model (SI Appendix, Fig. S6A).245
Experiment 2. To show that the LTM can capture people’s246
choice behavior across different tasks and allows us to predict247
when people will search too much or too little we conducted 248
a second experiment changing the distribution of options. 249
We manipulated the different task environments by sampling 250
tickets from (1) a left skewed (PERT∗(40,195,200)), (2) a 251
normal (PERT(90,140,190)) or (3) a right skewed distribution 252
(PERT(120,125,400)), representing a scarce, a normal and a 253
plentiful environment, respectively (SI Appendix, Fig. S1B-D, 254
red lines). Each participant was assigned to only one condition. 255
The final sample included 172 participants. The procedure 256
was identical to Experiment 1, consisting of a learning phase, 257
where participants got acquainted with the distribution (SI 258
Appendix, Fig. S1B-D, participant’s estimate in black lines), 259
and a testing phase. In the testing phase, participants had to 260
choose the lowest-priced ticket out of a sequence of 10 tickets 261
with 200 trials (Methods). 262
Behavioral results. Participants’ performance increased from 263
the left-skewed (scarce) environment to the right-skewed (plen- 264
tiful) environment (F (2, 268) = 114, p < .0001). As predicted 265
by the best performing linear model, the loss compared to 266
optimal performance was largest in the left-skewed condition, 267
where only few good tickets occur (SI Appendix, Fig. S6A). 268
The average search length decreased from the left skewed 269
scarce environment to the right skewed plentiful environment, 270
F (2, 268) = 11.5, p < .0001. This pattern also follows the pre- 271
dictions of the best performing linear model in the simulation 272
study but is in contrast to the optimal model’s predictions 273
(SI Appendix, Fig. S6B). Specifically, in the left skewed en- 274
vironment, where good tickets occur very rarely participants 275
searched too long compared to an optimal agent, whereas in 276
the environment where good tickets are abundant, participants 277
ended their search too early compared to the optimal strategy. 278
Modeling Results and Discussion. Modeling results replicate 279
the results from Experiment 1 and indicate that the LTM but 280
not the BOM performed extremely well (ppp < .05 for 7% 281
to 10% of participants across the three conditions for LTM, 282
∗The PERT distribution is a special case of the beta distribution defined by the minimum (a), most
likely (b) and maximum (c) values that a variable can take and an additional assumption that its
expected value is µ =
a + 4b + c
6
.




but ppp < .05 for 20% to 55% of participants for BOM, SI283
Appendix, Fig. S7). The observed accept probabilities (Fig. 2A-284
C, black lines, where each line represents a ticket price within285
the specified quantile range) are adequately described by LTM286
predictions (red lines) on almost all positions and in all three287
environments. Moreover, the threshold parameters for the288
ITM are again on top of the threshold parameters estimated289
by the LTM in all the three environmental conditions (SI290
Appendix, Fig. S8A-C).291
These results indicate that humans use a linear threshold in292
optimal stopping problems, independent of the distributional293
characters of the task. However, this does not mean that people294
do not adapt to the task at all. Participants are responsive295
to task features and adapt their first threshold and the slope296
to the distributional characteristics of the task within the297
constraints of the linear model (SI Appendix, Fig. S8A-C).298
Experiment 1 and 2 show that the linear model reflects a ro-299
bust psychological process when deciding between sequentially300
presented options. However, in both experiments deciders were301
explicitly trained on the distribution of options, something302
not common in real life decision making. The next experiment303
tests if the linear strategy can also explain choices in a realistic304
optimal stopping task where initial learning is omitted.305
Experiment 3. The decision maker’s goal is to buy online prod-306
ucts at the lowest rate where prices for this product are pre-307
sented sequentially. We selected commodity products from308
different categories (e.g food, leisure, kitchen tools) and col-309
lected for each product a set of prices from Amazon.com. Only310
products with approximately normal price distributions were311
selected for a final set of 60 products (SI Appendix, Table312
S1). In the experiment, prices were sampled from a normal313
distribution, with a mean and standard deviation estimated314
from the real prices. All participants worked on 120 trials,315
divided into two blocks of 60 trials. In these two blocks, the316
60 products were displayed in a random order (each product317
was encountered twice). Participants were aware that they318
could see up to 10 prices in each trial, and we indicated the319
average price of each product on the screen to reflect that320
people often have an idea of familiar products’ prizes and to321
minimize individual differences in these. 322
Behavioral Results. Data from 95 participants were analyzed 323
and replicated the results from Experiments 1 and 2 (nor- 324
mal distribution condition). Again, participants accepted too 325
early, on average at position 4.6 (SD: 2.9). Comparing the 326
performance in detail to the optimal strategy showed that (SI 327
Appendix, Fig. S9) participants accepted too frequently at 328
the beginning of the sequence (i.e., too low threshold) and 329
searched too long towards the end of the sequence (i.e., too 330
high threshold). We again found no evidence for learning 331
across trials (linear mixed model on points per trial with trial 332
number as fixed effect and by-participant random intercepts 333
and random slopes for trial number showed no significant effect 334
of trial number F (1, 94) = 0.13, p = 0.72). 335
Modeling Results. To deal with the prices’ variability we nor- 336
malized all values using mean and SD prior to fitting our 337
models. We could replicate the results from Experiment 1 and 338
2, despite the fact that participants did not explicitly learn the 339
product’s prices beforehand: The LTM (10% of ppp < .05, SI 340
Appendix, Fig. S10A), but not the BOM (31% of ppp < .05, SI 341
Appendix, Fig. S10C), was able to capture the observed accept 342
probabilities accurately on each position and for each quantile 343
(Fig. 3B&C). Furthermore, threshold parameters estimated by 344
the LTM were very similar to threshold parameters estimated 345
by the ITM (SI Appendix, Fig. S11). 346
Discussion. In this paper, we designed a variant of an optimal 347
stopping task that allowed us to quantitatively characterize 348
the deviations of human behaviour from optimality. We found 349
that humans apply a simplifying strategy, where thresholds are 350
linearly increased over time. We implemented this assumption 351
in a computational framework and demonstrated that this 352
model not only provided an excellent fit to the data, it also 353
outperformed other models found in the optimal stopping liter- 354
ature. Furthermore, the linear threshold assumption makes a 355
non-trivial prediction about search length, which we confirmed 356
experimentally: Humans stop earlier in environments with 357




















































































































































































































Fig. 3. (A) Screenshot of the product purchasing task. (B and C) Results of experiment 3: (B) Empirical data appear in solid black lines and the posterior predictive means of
the LTM in dashed red lines. (C) Empirical data appear in solid black lines and the posterior predictive means of the BOM in dashed yellow lines. Bars represent the 95% HDI.
The different lines represent the product prices ranging from the first quantile to the fifth quantile. Q1: Product prices in first quantile, Q2: Product prices between the first and
second quantile, Q3: Product prices ranging from second to third quantile, etc.




These results contrast with the prediction from the optimal359
model. Finally, in a online product purchase paradigm we360
could show that our model generalizes to real-world sequential361
choice problems. Understanding how humans make sequential362
decisions will help quantify the conditions under which people363
may succeed or fail in such tasks.364
But why are humans relying on a linear strategy in adapt-365
ing their thresholds when an optimal policy is nonlinear? For366
one, our findings correspond well with recent studies demon-367
strating that human choice behavior in related explore-exploit368
paradigms is well described by a linear threshold rule (13, 14).369
But a human linearity bias seems to be more general. Indeed,370
a tendency to assume linear relationships has been reported371
in a range of domains such as function learning (15, 16) and372
reasoning (17–19). Crucially, simple strategies do not neces-373
sarily perform badly. In particular in uncertain and complex374
environments, simple heuristics can be efficient and powerful375
tools if they are adapted to the structure of the environment376
(20, 21). In this context, linearity could be considered as an377
adaptation of the human mind to its environment.378
Materials and Methods379
380
Participants. We recruited 438 participants (272 females; age range:381
18-62; N1 = 144, N2left = 92, N2normal = 110, N2right = 92,382
N3 = 100 in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, respectively) on Amazon383
Mechanical Turk to participate in the experiments. Participants384
gave informed consent, and the Harvard Committee on the Use385
of Human Subjects approved the experiments. Participants were386
excluded from analysis if they accepted the first option in a trial387
in more than 95% of the trials. After applying these criteria, we388
included data from 499 participants in the subsequent analysis389
(N1 = 129,N2left = 86,N2normal = 102,N2right = 84,N3 = 95).390
Task. In Exp. 1 and 2, participants performed the same online ticket391
shopping task that consisted of a learning and a testing phase. In the392
learning phase, participants experienced the distribution from which393
the ticket prices were drawn. In Exp. 1, the distribution from which394
the values were sampled was normal with N (µ = 180, σ = 20). The395
procedure was as follows (SI Appendix, Fig. S2A-D): Participants396
encountered sequentially 50 ticket prices drawn from the predefined397
distribution. After every ten tickets, participants had to guess the398
average value of the tickets seen so far. After each guess, participants399
were told the correct response. At the end of the learning phase400
participants were asked to complete a histogram (by dragging the401
bars) for an additional 100 tickets that were drawn from the same402
predefined distribution. Participants received feedback by observing403
the correct distribution superimposed over their estimate (12).404
In Exp. 2, we used three conditions to realize three dif-405
ferent distributional environments, a left skewed distribution,406
PERT(40,195,200), a normal distribution, PERT(90,140,190), and407
a right skewed distribution, PERT(120,125,400). The procedure of408
the learning phase was identical to Exp. 1, except that we removed409
the section about reporting the mean for the skewed distributions410
(SI Appendix, Fig. S2B). Visual inspection of the performance in411
the histogram task suggested that participants learned the target412
distributions well (SI Appendix, Fig. S1).413
In the second phase of Exp. 1 and 2, participants performed the414
ticket-shopping task. It started with a practice trial followed by 200415
test trials. In each trial participants searched through a sequence of416
10 ticket prices randomly drawn from the predefined distribution.417
For each ticket, they could decide to accept or reject it at their own418
speed. People were aware that they could see up to 10 tickets in419
each trial and they were always informed about the actual position420
and the number of remaining tickets (SI Appendix, Fig. S2E). It421
was not possible to go back to an earlier option after it was initially422
declined. If they reached the last (10th) ticket they were forced423
to accept this ticket. When participants accepted the ticket, they424
received explicit feedback about how much they could have saved425
by choosing the lowest-priced ticket in the sequence (SI Appendix, 426
Fig. S2F). 427
Participants were paid according to their performance. In each
of the 200 trials there was a maximum of 20 points to earn. The
participants received the maximum number of 20 points if they
chose the lowest-priced ticket and 0 points for the worst ticket in
the sequence. The payoff for a ticket that lied between the lowest-
priced and the highest-priced was calculated proportional to the
distance to the lowest-priced ticket in the sequence. The exact
calculation for the points in each trial i was as follows:
pointsi =
20 · (ticketmax − ticketchosen)
ticketmax − ticketmin
, [4]
where ticketmax represents the most expensive ticket in the sequence 428
and ticketmin the cheapest ticket in the sequence. Participants 429
received a base payment of $4 and earned between $0 and $4 430
additionally depending on their performance. 431
In Exp. 3, participants performed an online product shopping 432
task that started with a practice trial followed by 120 test trials 433
divided into two blocks containing the same sixty products. In each 434
trial, they encountered a product and searched trough a sequence of 435
ten prices. Prices were randomly drawn from a normal distribution 436
with a mean and standard deviation estimated from realistic prices 437
collected from Amazon.com. Participants received a base payment 438
of $2 and a performance contingent bonus between $0 and $4. 439
Data Availability. Data and modeling scripts are available on the 440
Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/wqth3/. 441
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